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Charles DeGaulle once made the caustic quip that Brazil "is not a serious 
country." Unfortunately, this misguided and tragically ignorant remark 
evinces a prejudice which has not been the exclusive monopoly of the right. 
Throughout the 198s, much of the North American left virtually ignored a 
remarkable mass movement for democratic change in Latin America's largest 
country, focusing almost exclusively on the heroic popular struggles in 
Central America and Southern Africa. This is most ironic, since the Brazilian 
Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT) represents one of the few 
tangible hopes for a left struggling to define itself in a world which currently 
denies the validity of any socialist aspiration. 
Fortunately, there are three recently published works which give the 
Brazilian Workers' Party the attention that it should have received in North 
American commentary at least a decade ago. Each work differs widely from 
the others in its approach and analytic focus. And for this very reason, all 
three books make an invaluable contribution to the debate and discussion 
concerning one of the world's most remarkable political movements. 
The authors of Without Fear of Being Happy (the title is an exact transla- 
tion of the PT's slogan during Luiz Inicio Lula da Silva's presidential election 
campaign of 1989 - "Sem Medo De Ser Feliz") are eminently qualified to 
write a history of the Workers' Party. Brazilian sociologist Emir Sader 
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teaches at the University of S5o Paulo and has published extensively on both 
the PT and the Latin American left. American journalist Ken Silverstein was a 
correspondent for the Associated Press in Rio de Janeiro for three years, 
having witnessed and chronicled the Brazilian presidential race of 1989. 
Although Without Fear of Being Happy is largely a journalistic narrative of 
the PT's birth and development, it also ventures some general observations 
about the party's unique contribution to the future of left politics. But as 
Silverstein admitted to this reviewer, the book is not an exhaustive disserta- 
tion (e.g. by comparison to Keck's publication). Rather, it is intended to serve 
as an introduction of the Workers' Party to a readership largely unfamiliar 
with contemporary Brazilian politics. In this respect, Without Fear of Being 
Happy is a major success, notwithstanding a few critical flaws in its analysis. 
Margaret Keck, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale 
University, has arguably written the most comprehensive review of the PT to 
appear anywhere (including Brazil). The Workers' Party and 
Democratization in Brazil is an academic magnum opus, and should be 
required reading for all university courses dealing with Latin American poli- 
tics. Keck's initial research began over ten years ago as she was preparing her 
doctoral thesis at Columbia University. From 1983 to 1991, she made several 
visits to Brazil, obtaining more interview data as well as witnessing some of 
the most critical events in the party's evolution. Because she was able to win 
the well-founded trust of PT activists and leaders, Keck provides the reader 
with critical insights into the history, structure, personalities, ideological 
tendencies and internal conflicts of the party. 
Although Utopia Unarmed is a contemporary history and analysis of the 
entire Latin American left, Jorge Castaiieda devotes considerable attention to 
the PT. His comments are based on an impressive review of the secondary 
literature as well as original interviews conducted with party leaders and 
Brazilian academics. His work is enjoying enormous commercial success, and 
has received widespread critical acclaim. Castaiieda is a professor of econom- 
ics and international affairs at the National Autonomous University of 
Mexico. He also serves as a special adviser on international affairs to 
Cuauhttmoc Cardenas, the renowned leader of Mexico's Democratic 
Revolutionary Party (PRD - Partido Revolucion6rio Democritico). 
Each of the three books offers a very different description of the PT's 
ideology and praxis. At one end of the spectrum are Sader and Silverstein, 
who contend that, even though the party has made a radical commitment to 
democracy, its internal structure creates "a mix between total grassroots 
control and the Leninist conception of the vanguard." (50, emphasis added) 
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They see the PT "as a revolutionary party operating within a bourgeois insti- 
tutional framework with the express project of installing a new political 
system, socialism." (99-100) For them, it is nothing short of remarkable that 
"a radical socialist party" can flourish in a world whose new secular religion 
has become neo-liberalism. 
Castaiieda represents the opposite extreme in the debate, contending that 
the entire Latin American left, including the PT, must come to terms with the 
"end of history." For Castafieda, the socialist paradigm is fatally discredited, 
and the left is forced to accept the predominance of the free market. 
Nevertheless, Castaiieda contends that the Workers' Party has much to offer 
by advancing a program of "social democratic reforms." Castaiieda is 
absolutely explicit in his depiction of the PT as being reformist: 
Every now and then, the Brazilian Workers' Party claims that it does not 
wish to become a reformist, social democratic organization. But if one 
looks at what it does and not so much at what it says, it is in fact becoming 
just that. The difference between social democratic reformism and revolu- 
tionary socialism consists above all in renouncing the idea of revolution 
and socialism as a distinct stage of world history, and accepting that the so- 
called minimum program, or the sum of tactical objectives, and the maxi- 
mum program, or the sum of strategic aims, become indistinguish- 
able. (153) 
As a political scientist concerned with the PT's historical-institutional 
development, Margaret Keck avoids ideological typecasting. Nevertheless, 
she leaves the reader with the clear impression of a radically democratic party 
with utopian aspirations toward socialism, simultaneously rejecting revolu- 
tionary Leninist vanguardism and social democratic reformism. In my judg- 
ment, Keck's portrayal of the Brazilian Workers' Party is the most authentic. 
All three books comment on the following phases of the party's evolu- 
tion: the founding of the PT in 1980, its 1982 electoral debacle, the party's 
electoral recovery of the mid and late eighties, and the 1989 presidential 
campaign. In reviewing these stages of the party's development, Keck, 
Castaiieda and Sader and Silverstein touch on three critical themes: the PT's 
relationship with the Brazilian labor movement, the integrity of the PT as a 
class-based party versus the electoral necessity for wider appeal, and the issue 
of whether the PT should devote its energy and resources to the long-run 
mobilization and radicalization of civil society versus the pursuit of electoral 
victories in the existing power structure. 
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Formation of the Party 
The major initiative to form the PT came from the "Novo Sindicalismo," or 
"New Unionism" movement of the late 1970s. At that time, a new generation 
of labor activists, including Lula, who was then President of the S5o Bemardo 
Metalworkers Union, decided to directly challenge the labour court system of 
compulsory interest arbitration by striking and bargaining directly with the 
major transnational auto companies. This initiative not only threatened the 
official labour relations order, but challenged the entire military regime. 
Brazil's new unionists also perceived the necessity of creating an authentic 
labour party, since the officially recognized opposition, the MDB 
(Movimento Democriitico Brasileiro - Brazilian Democratic Movement) 
and its elite leadership, did not effectively represent labour's interests. 
Consequently, progressive trade unionists launched the PT on 14 October 
1979. 
Although the new unionists assumed the leading role in the PT's 
creation, progressive clergy, intellectuals, and activists from other left parties 
were also involved. Lula maintained that a labour party had to extend its 
appeal beyond union membership to unorganized wage earners and to the 
poor in general. He argued against an official institutional relationship 
between unions and the PT, as such an official nexus would compromise 
oganized labour's autonomy. 
As central as the industrial working class has been to the PT's develop- 
ment, Margaret Keck surmises that the party will not follow the European 
pattern oElabour politics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Several critical factors contributing to the recent decline of European social 
democratic parties already exist in Brazil: 
The formation of a mass party at this juncture in world history also brings 
to mind various factors that have been analyzed to explain the decline of 
mass parties in the European context. The centrality of state bureaucracies 
in decision making undermines the role of parties in providing access to 
government; the growing role of the mass media as a source of political 
information undermines its educational and informational role; the welfare 
state has replaced the social worker role that some parties once played; an 
increase in leisure time and a wealth of voluntary associations compete 
with the party as a social network and as a focus of membership participa- 
tion; and in some cases state financing has replaced membership financing 
in importance to these parties. At the very least, the first two of these 
factors are as salient in Brazil as in the countries for which the decline of 
the mass party is posited, and the first one perhaps even more so. (14) 
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In addition, the PT has to deal with a whole set of social questions going 
beyond the European tradition. Much of Brazilian organized labour has 
become increasingly white collar, with the CUT's (Central dnica dos 
Trabalhadores - Sole Central of Workers, Brazil's largest and most dynamic 
labour central) growth occurring among bankworkers, professionals, and 
public sector employees. Moreover, environmentalists, feminists, Afro- 
Brazilians, indigenous nations, and gay activists have all gravitated to the PT, 
further altering a traditionally workerist agenda. In sum, the PT was formed in 
what Keck calls a politically distinct "time and space," challenging traditional 
left notions of electoral participation and social mobilization. 
Given this distinct and difficult conjuncture for the Brazilian left (and for 
the left in general), how do each of the writers precisely define the relation- 
ship between the PT and the Brazilian labor movement? For Sader and 
Silverstein, the PT and the CUT are the same thing. (The CUT represents 
approximately 20 million Brazilian workers from over 1800 affiliated sindi- 
catos (local unions); the CUT has developed parallel, autonomous structures 
which challenge the official labour relations order, and is the direct outgrowth 
of the novo sindicalismo movement). Sader and Silverstein imply that the PT 
went out on strike against itself when Siio Paulo municipal employees walked 
off their jobs during the PT administration of Mayor Luiza Erundina: 
After taking office, Erundina rapidly adopted a more moderate approach 
toward municipal administration. Her policies were based on the idea of a 
'public sphere,' which she, as the popularly elected mayor, should defend. 
This orientation was soon tested when strikes by public employees broke 
out, led by the CUT (and hence the PT). (108) 
The above depiction is overly simplistic. Although the vast majority of the 
CUT's base is PT affiliated, there is a minority which is not. A number of 
CUT leaders and militants are members of the PPS (Partido Popular Socialista 
- Socialist Popular Party, formerly the Brazilian Communist Party), the 
PCdoB (Partido Comunista do Brasil -Communist Party of Brazil), the PSB 
(Partido Socialista Brasileiro - Brazilian Socialist Party), the PSTU (Partido 
Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado - Unified Socialist Party of the 
Workers, formerly the Convergencia Socialista), the PDT of Leone1 Brizola 
(Partido Democrhtico Trabalhista - Democratic Labor Party), and the PSDB 
(Partido Social DemocrAtico Brasileiro - Brazilian Social Democratic 
Party). In no way did the party "create" the labour central in 1983 nor, as Lula 
insisted from the beginning, was there a formal institutional link between 
trade unions and the PT, as there had been between the TUC and the British 
Labour Party, for example. 
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Jorge Castafieda assumes precisely the opposite stand. For him, the PT 
failed to achieve its original goal of becoming "the party of the Brazilian 
working class." (153) He argues that a fair number of labour leaders have 
been openly antagonistic to the PT. But Castaiieda is most mistaken in assum- 
ing that the Workers' Party intended to "hegemonize" the official union struc- 
ture. Such an idea offended the party's commitment to political and trade 
union pluralism. Moreover, the PT never attempted to win over the reac- 
tionary and pro-corporatist leadership (i.e. the official national confedera- 
tions). The party always assumed that such elements would be hostile to the 
PT's support for novo sindicalismo. However, the PT enjoys the active partic- 
ipation and affiliation of many progressive and anti-corporatist trade union 
militants. 
Keck most accurately describes the complex relationship between labour 
and the party. She notes the significant intersection of leadership between the 
CUT and PT, and observes that many of the same people have to "act on two 
different institutional fronts." (184) But Keck insists that the party has never 
used the unions as instruments of its own policy. She describes the PT as 
being organically linked with the CUT, but without assuming any vanguard 
role: 
The party was not so much to lead workers as to express in the political 
arena the demands of social movements and unions. The creation of the 
party was thus a strategic response by a sector of the labor movement for 
the achievement of goals that had already been articulated elsewhere. It was 
to be both more than (with regard to what it might achieve) and less than 
(with regard to its initiative in posing goals and needs) the unions them- 
selves. ( l  80-1) 
The 1982 Elections 
Since its founding, the PT has never questioned the necessity of following the 
electoral road. Such a conviction is what makes it a political party as opposed 
to a social or revolutionary movement. Nevertheless, it has struggled to 
accommodate two goals: using elections as a means of consolidating political 
organization and strengthening the political expression of social movements 
in civil society, versus the objective of actually achieving electoral victory in 
the existing power structure. This internal conflict explains much of the PT's 
electoral history and performance over the last fourteen years. As Keck has 
observed, the tension has not disappeared. 
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The 1982 Congressional, gubernatorial, and municipal races presented 
the PT with its first major electoral test. The disappointing results suggested 
that the party may have been victimized by its internal contradiction over the 
purpose of electoral politics. The PT won less than five percent of the national 
vote, electing only eight federal deputies, six of whom were from SBo Paulo, 
one from Rio de Janeiro and one from Minas Gerais. It managed to elect one 
state deputy in Rio de Janeiro, one in Minas Gerais, one in Acre, and nine in 
SFio Paulo. The PT won only two mayoral races, Diadema (SBo Paulo) and 
Santa QuitCria (MaranhFio). 
Sader and Silverstein present a descriptive rather than a deeply analytical 
account of the PT's 1982 debacle. But they leave the reader with the distinct 
impression that the party had no one to blame but itself and was guilty of 
having committed fatal tactical errors. They point out that the PT's charter 
defined electoral participation "as a tool in the organization and mobilization 
of workers and the construction of popular power" as opposed to actually 
winning seats. They contend that once the party assigned greater priority to 
the mobilization of civil society, it opted against 
participating in any coalitions even before the restrictive legislation of the 
military regime was decreed. If the decision made possible the PT's pres- 
ence as an autonomous force, it ultimately encouraged 'tactical voting' - 
to the great detriment of the party's candidates - opposition supporters 
casting their ballots for the party with the best chance of beating the mili- 
tary's candidates. (79-80) 
The PT definitely tried to distance and distinguish itself from the rest of 
the political opposition. It argued that the PMDB (Partido do Movimento 
Democrhtico Brasileiro - Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement), the 
successor to the MDB, was elitist, bourgeois and incapable of representing 
workers' interests. Given its historical longevity and institutional strength, the 
PMDB had the best chance of defeating the military's party, the PDS (Partido 
Democratic0 Social - Democratic Social Party). Consequently, many within 
the opposition regarded the PT's electoral tactics to be nothing short of divi- 
sive, playing into the hands of the military dictatorship. The PMDB exploited 
these sentiments, and argued that the general public should cast a "useful 
vote," not wasting its time with a minority party with no political future. 
Like Sader and Silverstein, Keck acknowledges tactical errors in the 
1982 campaign: placing the party's strongest candidates in the Congressional 
rather than the gubernatorial races (with the exception of Lula, who unsuc- 
cessfully ran for governor of S50 Paulo), raising middle-class fears by empha- 
sizing the revolutionary past of PT candidates in the free media spots, and 
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failing to run sufficiently large party lists in many local races. Nevertheless, 
she raises the question that Sader and Silverstein miss entirely - what if the 
party had not attacked the rest of the opposition? 
Had the party refrained from attacking the PMDB, proving itself a "respon- 
sible" ally within a broader opposition, the impact of the voto util campaign 
might have been even stronger than it was, particularly among working 
class voters. Failure to respond would have implied acceptance of the idea 
that the Workers' Party was indeed a 'party of the future', whose role in the 
present was to wait. (148) 
Keck also points to four powerful incentives motivating the PT's strat- 
egy. First, one of the party's founding principles was to differentiate working 
class political organization from the general opposition. Second, the Brazilian 
electoral law said that for a party to remain legal, it had to run on its own and 
obtain five percent of the national vote and at least three percent of the vote in 
each of nine states. Obviously, the PT had to promote itself in contrast to 
other parties. Third, the PMDB's attacks against the PT, and particularly those 
which questioned the intellectual and organizational capabilities of workers, 
provoked a strongly psychological reaction from party activists. And finally, 
the positive public response to PT rallies genuinely convinced many party 
leaders that they stood a fair chance against the PMDB. 
The Electoral Recovery 
Immediately after the 1982 setback, many PT activists were inclined to devote 
their energies to the further mobilization of civil society. For example, union 
militants in the party helped inaugurate the CUT in late 1983. Nevertheless, 
the PT realized that it would have to face the next electoral challenge - the 
mayoral races of 1985. And to the great surprise and chagrin of the PMDB 
and other well-established political machines, the PT managed a respectable 
showing. The party ran candidates in all but one of the state capitals, winning 
over five percent of the vote in twelve of the races (and over three percent in 
two others). PT candidate Maria Luiza Fontanelle emerged victorious in 
Fortaleza, the capital of Ceara and the fifth largest city in Brazil. The PT also 
placed a close second in Goiiinia (Goias), Vitdria (Espirito Santo), and 
Aracaju (Sergipe), with PT mayoral candidate Eduardo Suplicy garnering 
twenty percent of the total vote in the city of SLo Paulo. Despite the initial 
popularity of the PMDB's anti-inflation program, known as the Plano 
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Cruzado, the PT's representation in the Federal Chamber of Deputies jumped 
to sixteen seats after the 1986 congressional elections. Lula won more votes 
than any other candidate for federal deputy in the entire history of the 
Brazilian Congress. 
Keck offers us convincing reasons as to why the PT became a serious 
electoral contender. In the first place, the party was running many more 
middle-class candidates in the mid-1980s. Such a move appealed to Brazil's 
sizable professional sector. Keck astutely observes that as the CUT expanded 
its white collar base, the PT's rhetoric and candidates also changed, given the 
organic links between the party and the labour central. Moreover, the PMDB 
could no longer benefit from being the institutional vanguard of the opposi- 
tion. To the contrary, it had become the ruling party in both the Congress and 
the Executive, and had aligned itself with direct descendants of the military 
regime. More and more, the general Brazilian electorate perceived the PT as 
being the true party of the opposition. Although the two conflicts referred to 
earlier (working class politics versus wider electoral appeal; mobilization of 
civil society versus electoral victories) did not disappear in the mid to late 
eighties, Keck asserts that "the context in which they were discussed did." 
(156) Given the growing public dissatisfaction with the PMDB's broken 
promises and its alliances with corrupt and reactionary elements, the whole 
electoral process "seemed more worthwhile" to PT militants. (156) 
All of the elements militating in favor of the PT's electoral viability in 
1985 and 1986 also affected the results of the 1988 municipal elections. The 
PT prevailed in 36 mayoral races, including Siio Paulo and Porto Alegre. 
Sader and Silverstein perceptively note that the party was able to capitalize on 
two realities which had fueled a massive public ire against the PMDB: the 
monumental failure of the Plano Cruzado to curb inflation and the govern- 
ment's bloody repression of the strike at the National Steel Company in Volta 
Redonda. 
The 1989 Presidential Campaign 
Brazil's presidential race of 1989 was the PT's electoral highpoint. Latin 
America's superpower came very close to having a decidedly left government 
in power, with an autoworker and trade union militant as the chief executive. 
Lula captured over 31 million to Fernando Collor's 35 million votes. During 
the week prior to the 15 December runoff, the polls indicated that Lula and 
Collor were virtually in a dead heat. Keck observes, rather cryptically, that the 
last televised debate only a few days before the election, "followed upon an 
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intense burst of negative campaign advertising by the Collor campaign." Keck 
tells us that "Collor's victory in the second debate probably helped to consol- 
idate his l e a d  on the eve of the election. (159) 
Her lack of commentary concerning the 1989 campaign is in markedly 
sharp contrast to her detailed and perceptive analysis of 1982 and the mid- 
1980s. She offers us no sense of how the PT brokered its two internal conflicts 
(class integrity versus public appeal and immediate victory versus mobiliza- 
tion of civil society) at this most critical moment. 
The strength of the Sader and Silverstein narrative comes through in their 
detailed account of the presidential race. Without Fear of Being Happy is 
unquestionably the best chronicle of the 1989 campaign to have been 
published in North America. Sader and Silverstein recount those elements 
contributing to Lula's success in reaching the presidential runoff: the lack of 
any credible and viable right-wing competition to Collor's candidacy, the 
PT's skilful use of the free media time, and the PT's unparalleled ability for 
mass organization, by far the party's strongest electoral asset. Sader and 
Silverstein also relate in graphic detail all of the destructive methods 
employed by the Collor campaign in the second round, which Keck 
euphemistically terms "intense negative campaigning." TV Globo's biased 
editing of the final televised debate, the Collor campaign's bribery of Lula's 
ex-companheira Miriam Cordeiro to engage in slander, the media's libelous 
attempt to link the kidnapping of Brazilian businessman Abilio Diniz with the 
PT, and the interruption of public transportation on election day by anti-Lula 
local bosses in the North and Northeast, are all tactics which Sader and 
Silverstein report with shocking clarity. 
Conclusion 
As I suggested at the beginning of this review, each of the three books 
presents a distinctively different version of the PT's ideology and praxis. As 
noted earlier, Sader and Silverstein depict the PT as a "revolutionary party in 
a bourgeois institutional framework," still partially attached to the "Leninist 
conception of the vanguard." Both Keck and Castafieda reject such a charac- 
terization, and I would join them in their assessment. The depiction misleads 
the reader into thinking that the PT has breathed new life into Leninist ortho- 
doxy, when, in fact, the very opposite is the case. The PT made a conscious 
and definitive break with what it perceived as the anti-democratic practices of 
the revolutionary left, making internal democratic process a fundamental 
priority. 
Being the thoroughly open, ecumenical, non-doctrinaire, mass-based, 
and democratic party that it is, the PT has accepted tendencies which claim to 
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be revolutionary and pledge allegiance to democratic centralism. But as much 
as these minority tendencies (i.e. the PCBR - Brazilian Revolutionary 
Communist Party and the Converg6ncia Socialista) advocated Leninist 
tactics, they failed to achieve ideological or organizational hegemony. To the 
contrary, a majority bloc known at the Articula@Zio, consisting of trade union- 
ists, Catholic activists and intellectuals, thoroughly rejects vanguardism and 
advocates the principles of internal democracy. 
It is undeniable that the party expects each member to abide by its deci- 
sions once they have been democratically determined. (For example, federal 
deputies Airton Soares and Bete Mendes were forced to leave the PT when 
they refused to obey the party's decision to boycott the electoral college selec- 
tion of Brazil's president in 1984.) But such a policy of internal discipline is 
altogether distinct from the practice of revolutionary cadres imposing their 
"wisdom" on the majority. 
The PT made its policy of internal democratic governance most explicit 
in its national directorate's resolution of 1986: 
1. The PT is a democratic, socialist, and mass-party. It is therefore not a 
front of political organizations, nor is it an institutional mass-front that can 
be used as an instrument by any political party. 
2. As a democratic party, the PT defines and exercises the recognition of 
the will of the majority, assuring at the same time, the existence of minori- 
ties and their right to be represented and to express themselves in all 
instances of the party. 
3. The national meeting recognizes the right of the tendencia and deter- 
mines that the next national diret6rio will proceed with their regulation. But 
the party understands that this right cannot be extended to groups which do 
not adopt the program of the PT nor to those which do not accept its democ- 
racy and discipline. In the same vein, the right of the tendencia does not 
authorize militancy in parties other than the PT. (Keck, 117-18) 
Since the Trotskyist tendency known as the ConvergEncia Socialista had 
chronically violated the first and third principles of the party's 1986 resolution 
by using the PT as a front for its own purposes, it was expelled two years ago. 
Perhaps the clearest rejection of revolutionary vanguardism came from 
the mouth of Lula himself: 
[The PT] is a party born out of the consciousness that workers won after 
many decades of serving as a mass to be manipulated by bourgeois politi- 
cians and of listening to the ballads of the supposed vanguard parties of the 
working class. Only the workers can win what they have a right to. No one 
ever has and no one ever will give us anything for free. (Quoted in Keck, 
126) 
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Jorge Castaiieda's characterization of the PT as being nothing more than 
social democratic and reformist must also be submitted to intense scrutiny and 
criticism. Castaiieda makes the sweeping assertion that all of the Latin 
American left committed to the electoral path fits the reformist mold. He 
argues that the Latin America left accepts the moderate social democratic 
reform of market capitalism because the "revolutionary socialist paradigm" 
has collapsed entirely. He associates the revolutionary model with both 
Castro's Cuba and the command economies of the former Eastern bloc. 
Although he admits the existence of a "discontinuity between the Cuban revo- 
lution and the theory and practice of traditional Communist parties of Latin 
America," Castaiieda contends that the economic planning of "the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe did form the model the Cubans and their followers 
believed in." And "one party rule, expropriation of the means of production, 
and aspirations of social homogeneity did represent undisputed features of the 
model in question." (73) 
Castaiieda contends that the death of the revolutionary socialist paradigm 
leaves the Latin American left "without a future ... For now, this vision of a 
better state of things to come is no longer credible and, consequently, no 
longer functional." (242) The most that the Latin American left can realisti- 
cally aspire to is "nothing more - though nothing less - than an adjusted, 
middle-of-the-road economic policy." (248) A kind of socially responsible 
minimalism is all that can be expected: 
By formally and sincerely accepting the logic of the market, and then 
immediately and equally sincerely endorsing the variations, regulations, 
exceptions, and adaptations the European and Japanese market economies 
have adopted over the years, the Latin American left can set the stage for 
the construction of a paradigm that is substantially different from the 
present state of affairs. (432) 
Castaiieda admits that the PT professes to be a democratic socialist party, but 
he asserts that "in everyday political life it has clearly deprived the term 
"socialism" of much of its content." He believes that the Brazilian Workers' 
Party, like the rest of the left worldwide, is going through a kind of maturation 
process, and will eventually "grow out of '  the infantile fixation with the 
socialist ideal. (154) 
Quoting Brazilian sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso as if he were 
an objective academic source (Cardoso is the PSDB candidate who recently 
prevailed in the 1994 presidential elections and actively opposed Lula's 
candidacy with a highly neo-liberaypro-privatization agenda), Castaiieda tells 
us that "in Brazil, social democracy is divided into three: the Brazilian Social 
Democratic Party (PSDB), Leone1 Brizola's Partido Democritico Trabalhista 
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(PDT), and Luiz Inhcio da Silva's ("Lula's") Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(PT)." (143) Thus, for Castaiieda, the three parties are essentially the same, 
and they "complement each other" with their respective assets. (144) 
The collapse of what Castaiieda calls the revolutionary socialist para- 
digm never left the Brazilian Workers' Party "lost" and "without a future." 
The PT never identified with the Soviet and Eastern bloc to begin with, and it 
completely rejected the notion of a centralized command economy with an 
anti-pluralist political order. Castaiieda concedes that the PT's concept of 
socialism is a far cry from the Cuban model, and he quotes Lula saying the 
following in a 1991 interview in Mexico City: 
The PT criticized Eastern Europe from its birth. We criticized the Berlin 
Wall, state bureaucracy, the absence of union freedom; we defended 
Walesa from the moment we were founded. (342, footnote 21) 
The problem with Castaiieda's concept of socialism is that it is entirely econ- 
omistic, static, and non-dialectical. This may be due to his particular training 
as an economist, but it makes for defective social and political analysis. In 
fact, Castaiieda appears to have ignored the social and political dimension 
altogether. His conclusions assume a false discontinuity between economic 
program and genuine efforts to democratize the state and civil institutions. For 
him, if the left rejects the centralized economic model, it must reject socialism 
altogether. 
The notion of socialism as the dynamic effort toward maximizing 
democracy, without a fixed economic masterplan, and guided by such princi- 
ples and policies as majority rule, protection and proportional representation 
of minorities, public control of strategic industries (such as petroleum and 
telecommunications), granting genuine participation to workers and commu- 
nities in managerial and investment decisions of strategic enterprises, localiz- 
ing and decentralizing state authority, and encouraging the growth of volun- 
tary collective organization in civil society, is not really contemplated by 
Castaiieda's limited and dualistic construct. Yet, the Brazilian Workers' Party 
advocates all of the policies noted above, as evinced in its charter, convention 
resolutions, internal rules, its platform for the 1994 elections, and its recent 
history of state administration, particularly at the municipal level. To label 
these as mere "social democratic reformism" is to deny the unprecedented 
potential of radical democratic initiative. 
Castaiieda's depiction of the PSDB, the PDT, and the Workers' Party as 
having "different assets," but sharing essentially the same ideology and 
philosophy of political action, thoroughly depreciates the PT's salient unique- 
ness. The PT is far more than a progressive party having "an organization, a 
working class constituency, and a rural following." Thoroughly unlike the 
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PSDB and the PDT, the Workers' Party is a genuinely mass-based political 
organization which is determined entirely from the bottom up, thoroughly 
eschews traditionally elite or caudilho-directed populism, and has the most 
radical and demanding system of internal democracy in the history of 
Brazilian politics. 
Margaret Keck's final chapter most faithfully depicts the PT's nature and 
character. Successfully capturing the highly voluntarist and anti-statist dispo- 
sition of the party, she describes the PT as having a "conception of politics" as 
"a process of claiming rights in practice, rather than demanding their conces- 
sion by the state." The party believes that "through the self-organization of 
society, the relations of power between state and society would change, and a 
new agenda based on societal needs would be created." (245) The idea of the 
good society is not overly "theorized in PT discourse, because it will emerge 
from the democratic practice of autonomous social actors." (245, emphasis 
added) The party's concept of socialism is not really an ideology (and far less 
a program), but an "ethical proposal, within which a number of alternative 
visions of the good society competed, using different languages." (245) Keck 
rejects the suggestion of Sader and Silverstein of a persisting vanguardism, 
but also discards Castaiieda's theory of "social democratic reformism." (247) 
Keck captures the social and political dimension of the socialist inspiration 
which Castaiieda misses entirely. She suggests that the PT represents a social- 
ist alternative which Castaiieda's typology fails to embrace. She argues that 
the party "has an intuition, if not a theoretically elaborated argument, that the 
socialism to which it aspires is also, and essentially, an aspiration for democ- 
racy." (250) 
Since the presidential race of 1989, the Brazilian Workers' Party has 
successfully managed to pursue its goal of strengthening civil society, while, 
at the same time, maintaining its electoral viability. With the approval of the 
PT, Lula declined to seek another term as federal deputy in 1990, opting to 
serve as president of the party instead. Over the last two years, he galvanized 
grassroots support by personally visiting every region of the country by bus, 
train, and boat. His efforts, along with those of numerous other party activists, 
produced significant electoral gains. In the 1992 municipal elections, the PT 
swept fifty six cities, including the state capitals of Porto Alegre, Rio Branco, 
Goiiinia, and Be10 Horizonte. 
The impeachment of President Collor in late 1992 for his involvement in 
an elaborate kickback scheme and subsequent revelations of corruption on the 
part of center-right federal deputies only enhanced the PT's credibility and 
respect among the general electorate. From late 1993 until July of 1994, Lula 
led all the polls for the 1994 presidential election, having reached an impres- 
sive 40 percent during his visit to the United States in May. At that time, he 
led his closest rival, Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the PSDB, by over a two 
to one margin. 
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Cardoso resigned as economics minister in the Itamar Franco govern- 
ment in order to compete in the 1994 presidential campaign. About two 
months prior to his exit from the administration, Cardoso's technical advisers 
designed another program to curb Brazil's incorrigible inflationary spiral - 
the Plano Real. The plan created a new currency roughly equivalent in value 
to the U.S. dollar. Cardoso has been regarded as one of Brazil's most promi- 
nent left intellectuals. His works on modern sociology have been read the 
world over. When he ran for federal senator (S20 Paulo) on the MDB ticket in 
1978, he was actively supported by many of Brazil's new unionists, including 
Lula. As he and other progressive politicians in the PMDB became increas- 
ingly disaffected with their party's rightward shift, they decided to launch the 
PSDB in the mid-eighties. 
But in order to maximize his chances for the presidency in 1994, 
Cardoso abandoned his left and social democratic past. He closed ranks with 
one of Brazil's most right-wing parties, the PFL (Partido da Frente Liberal - 
Liberal Front Party), and advocated a radically neo-liberal platform of virtu- 
ally unconditional free trade and economic integration with the rest of the 
hemisphere and unrestricted privatization of all state enterprises, including the 
strategic sectors of petroleum and telecommunications. Inflation continued 
unbridled even after the inauguration of the Plano Real, as high as fifty 
percent for the month of June. But with the concerted efforts of the Central 
Bank and Brazil's merchants to avoid a PT victory in October, inflation plum- 
meted to 6 percent in August and 1.5 percent in September. Cardoso 
predictably reaped the benefits. In the week prior to the 3 October elections, 
the polls showed Cardoso climbing to 46 percent with Lula trailing at 24 
percent. 
The government played its hand with regard to the master strategy. 
About three weeks before the election, Economics Minister Rubens Ricupero 
publicly admitted that the purpose of the Plano Real was to get Cardoso 
elected, and that he (Ricupero) had no scruples regarding achievement of the 
ultimate objective. Despite such a cynical admission from the government, 
general skepticism about the plan's longevity, and Lula's arguments that the 
Plano Real failed to confront the structural causes of inflation, such as the 
external debt, financial speculation, and oligopolistic pricing, the Brazilian 
public decided to believe that Cardoso was truly a magician. He won approx- 
imately 34 million votes to Lula's 17 million, with the rest of the candidates 
following far behind. Cardoso captured fifty four percent of the validly-cast 
votes, obtaining a majority in the first round. 
The question of how the PT could have lost its overwhelming lead in 
such a short period of time has been the source of grueling soul-searching and 
self-criticism over the past several days. Some have faulted Lula for making 
such a "frontal" attack on a popular plan. Others blame the party for not 
having mobilized its public rallies and the get-out-the-vote campaign much 
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earlier. It is still too early to assess all the factors contributing to Cardoso's 
victory. Massive financial backing from Brazil's wealthy elites, editorial 
favoritism and endorsements from Brazil's media monopolies (e.g. the Globo 
empire) and direct assistance from James Carville, Bill Clinton's renowned 
campaign manager, certainly helped, to say the least. Given the fabricated 
timing of the Plano Real's "success," it is not clear that Lula or the PT could 
have really done anything to avert the situation. 
But even with its presidential hopes dashed for now, the PT has proven 
that it is still a formidable contender. Lula's showing was respectable and well 
ahead that of third-place challenger Enehs Carneiro of the ultra-nationalist and 
fascist-inspired Partido da Reedificaqgo da Ordem Nacional (Party of the 
Reconstruction of the National Order), who weighed in with 4.6 million votes. 
Moreover, the Workers' Party is expected to increase its representation from 
37 to 70 seats in the Federal Chamber of Deputies (the votes are still being 
counted) and has gone from 1 seat to 5 in the Senate. The party also gathered 
enough votes to qualify for the 15 November gubernatorial runoffs in Brasilia, 
Espirito Santo and Rio Grande do Sul. It has consolidated enough political 
space in the last election to do that which it has done best over the last four- 
teen years: offer the Brazilian people a credible, principled and effective 
opposition. Without question, the PT continues to be a very serious party. And 
for the left throughout the world, Brazil will continue to be a very serious 
country. 
